Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis is under relentless attack from the far left, the left, the far right, the right, and even half of his own New Democracy party, including two former prime ministers leading the charge.
Despite this, he comfortably garners 41% of the vote, or at worst, double the percentage of the second-place party. Have his detractors ever considered why this is the case?
At one point, I thought former Prime Minister Antonis Samaras might call for mobilisation, judging by his fervent speech at the War Museum event. Why such animosity? This is their party and their prime minister, who has won every election he has contested, bolstered the country's economy and geopolitical standing, navigated the pandemic and hybrid threats from Turkey unscathed, and invested in key reforms, however cautiously. He has decimated the opposition to his left. Why, then, has he so angered his predecessors?
Mr. Samaras pointed out, "We lost 1 million votes."
That's incorrect.
The top brass of New Democracy fails to recognize that those million votes were never truly theirs. The 18.8 percent and 27.8 percent that Mr. Samaras achieved were theirs. The additional votes, bringing the total to 41 percent for Mr. Mitsotakis, come from centrists who lend their support not to New Democracy, but to Kyriakos.
These voters, whom New Democracy members dismissively call "Kyriakistas," are politically homeless centrists who believe Mr. Mitsotakis is the best politician compared to other New Democracy members. They support him to ensure the far-right and far-left never regain dominance. This is simple arithmetic.
Mr. Samaras asked aloud with whom New Democracy would ally if needed. He should explain why he, who collaborated (rightly) with Pasok and DIMAR (thus broadening to the "imaginary center" he now condemns), should not seek alliances now.
Should New Democracy ally with Natsios? Velopoulos? Latinopoulou? Who is their favourite pro-Russian?
Samaras questioned the effectiveness of the "executive state" with recycled ministers and marginalized MPs. Clearly, the untouchables like Mendoni, Pierrakakis, Skertsos, and Gerapetritis are an irritation. These "expansion" figures are, rightly or wrongly, effective. They form a good team alongside Adonis, Voridis, and New Democracy stalwarts like Olga, Dendias, and Hatzidakis.
Mr. Samaras's 2012 government included these same ministers. Unless Panos Panagiotopoulos and Nikos Nikolopoulos are seen as losses for the party!
During the Samaras platform, marriage equality, Europe's decline, and the drift from traditional values and family were condemned. There are valid points in this critique that deserve consideration. However, they were expressed with the same language used by Bardella, Velopoulos, and Natsios—an ideological entrenchment in a closed-off Europe. Is this the New Democracy the former leaders envision?
Symbolically, Mr. Samaras's most significant "statement" was attending an event organized by journalist Manolis Kottakis, with Vasiliki Thanou as a guest. "The enemy of my enemy is my friend!"
Mr. Samaras's adversaries duly criticized him the next day: Following the War Museum event, "Demokratia" newspaper (where Kottakis writes) revived the scenario of "wheeled suitcases" in Maximos Mansion (Novartis) and blamed Samaras for transforming New Democracy into a neoliberal mix of "mercenaries" from LAOS, To Potami, and Simitis's PASOK.
"Demokratia" also hit Mr. Samaras hard, explaining why he rebelled against Mr. Mitsotakis: "He lost all hope of becoming President of the Republic, European Commissioner, or even a commissioner of the Holy Church of Ypapanti in Kalamata." The article called him the party's "traitor" rather than its conscience. "Too late for tears, Antonis," it concluded.
In sum, Samaras has chosen the wrong enemies and friends. He attempted a "revolution" with those accusing him of prioritising party dominance and power access over ideology. Even the reclusive figure from Rafina set a perfect trap, leaving Samaras exposed.
It's now up to Mr. Mitsotakis to rise above.
For the first time in eight years, a serious internal front has opened in New Democracy. Regardless of intentions, scope, and goals, the outcome depends on Mr. Mitsotakis's ability over the next critical six months to choose the right people and policies: from policy statements at the Thessaloniki International Fair, managing New Democracy's barons, to selecting the President of the Republic and implementing serious and effective policies—the field is his.
By Sophia Giannaka